Understanding Merit: The relationship between good works and eternal life (part II)
[Written by Darius777]
(This blog will be the second of a three-part series on merit, understanding the relationship between good works and eternal life)As mentioned previously, the section of merit and the types of justice will appear to introduce the subject treated in every blog. In our previous article, we explored the Protestant view on good works (and as I have argued the biblical one), the possibility of keeping God's law, also concerning the necessity of good works to salvation, and whether and to what extent eternal life belongs to grace and at the same time is a reward given to our works. Since this is a topic often treated superficially today by both Catholics and Protestants, in these blogs I will attempt at the best of my ability to accurately and charitably portray the various positions of both sides for the glory of Christ and a better appreciation of His gospel. It is necessary for an adequate understanding of the topic discussed here and in the next blog that the reader carefully considers the previous article.
[Introduction: brief considerations concerning merit and the different types of justice]
Nature of merit
For Roman Catholic theologians, merit is a work which obtains from God a certain benefit. They distinguish between two kinds of merit: congruent and condign merit. The former is not rooted in the idea of justice: something is congruously meritorious simply according to the good pleasure of the giver (there is a certain fittingness between the reward and the work, but there is no obligation of justice in the retributor). The latter is necessarily rooted in divine justice: and condign merit may be considered in the strict sense and in the broad sense. In both cases, justice obligates the giver to offer the gift to him that works. The reward is due to him who works. If understood in the strict sense, condign merit implies an absolute equality of value between the work meriting and the reward merited, such that the one who gives the reward is extrinsically bound to offer it due to this “equality”, he is bound of necessity. Such a model transferred to the christian life would make God a debtor of eternal life to those who perform condignly meritorious works out of necessity- nevertheless, the Romanists do not accept this sense of condign merit. However, if understood in the broad sense, condign merit wouldn't necessitate an absolute equality of value between work and reward. The giver is not extrinsically, but intrinsically bound. God, by the covenantal promise He made to those who work their salvation with fear and trembling is covenentally bound (or bound by his promise) to offer the reward to him who works. The reward is according to promised merit. It is the promise that obligates God to give a reward, this alone induces in God a debt of justice.
[However among the romanist theologians there is not agreement about what kind of equality there is between good works and eternal life: some affirm arithmetic or absolute/numerical equality of value between good works and eternal life; others affirm geometric or proportional equality, which implies a proportion of agreement between good works and eternal life, but they don't have the same value considered in themselves]
Types of justice
Of particular importance in understanding the subject at hand, is perceiving the difference between two types of justice frequently used by medieval, tridentine and post-tridentine theologians in the discussion of merit: distributive justice and commutative justice. The former deals with a just distribution of goods by an authority to its subjects based on merit or need. The latter deals with fairness and justice in individual transactions and exchanges. These are the following conditions of commutative justice: 1) the equality of thing to thing, which maintains that there is an equal value (arithmetic equality) between the works and the reward; 2) a mutual giving and receiving on both sides, namely the subject who works "gives his works” to the retributor as payment, and the retributor receives them. Furthermore, the retributor in exchange gives the worker a reward, and receives from him works (which function as a kind of payment); thus there follows a mutual benefit or damage from such an exchange; 3) from the acceptance of said works by the retributor there arises a debt, and an obligation of justice in the retributor, by the force of the right acquired by the other through the work presented and given. In contrast, distributive justice does not require an absolute equality of moral value and worthiness, but simply that there be a proportion of agreement and suitability between them. It is required for distributive justice, that more reward be given than it is due to the work, there is however no mutual giving and receiving since this kind of justice does not concern itself with exchanges between individuals.
Tridentine dogma
It is well known that the Roman Catholic Church dogmatically teaches that the faithful merit condingly eternal life, and that eternal life is rewarded to them out of justice and by right. This is evident in the Council of Trent, Sixth Session, for this is how all theologians after Trent interpret this canon:
CANON XXXII. If any one saith, that the good works of one that is justified are in such manner the gifts of God, as that they are not also the good merits of him that is justified; or, that the said justified, by the good works which he performs through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is, does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life,-if so be, however, that he depart in grace,-and also an increase of glory; let him be anathema.
However, it is not without difficulty that their meaning might be misunderstood, which often is the case in contemporary discussions. And although, the Roman church dogmatically teaches that the faithful can condignly merit eternal life, there is huge disagreement between the post-tridentine theologians concerning the meaning of ‘condign merit’, and the relationship between good works and eternal life, some farther and some closer to the biblical truth on this matter.
Firstly, we must start with what all theologians recognize without controversy. Towards the end of the 16th century, French professor Michael of Louvain taught that the grace of adoption/regeneration is not the foundation of merit or that by virtue of which our works are acceptable to God and meritorious of eternal life, but simply conformity to the law. Furthermore, he also believed that good works are meritorious of eternal life without any gratuitous promise on the part of God. [Condign merit in the strict sense, as distinguished in the introduction]. This pelagian opinion was condemned in two subsequent papal bulls, those of Pope Pius V and Gregory XIII. In the papal bull “Ex omnibus affectionibus”, two following propositions of Michael were condemned:
1. “Good works done through the spirit of adoption do not acquire the nature of merit because they are done through the spirit of adoption dwelling in the hearts of the sons of God, but rather because they are in conformity with the law.”
2. "It is a Pelagian opinion that a good work done without the grace of adoption is not meritorious of the heavenly kingdom."
Therefore, the theologians of the Roman Church unanimously teach that adoption is a necessary prerequisite for one who merits eternal life, and that the grace of adoption is that condition by virtue of which our works are condignly meritorious for eternal life.
"The proper foundation of merit, is primarily and especially that the works of the just are the works of the sons of God, which proceed from the grace of the indwelling Holy Spirit in us… Therefore, inheritance is given, not only because we are sons, but because we are good sons suffering with Christ: nor again because we are good only, but because we are good sons. For neither goodness nor justice of works has any right to the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom except in the sons of God: nor does mere adoption without the justice of good works attain that right by way of merit."- Thomas Stapleton, On Justification, Book X, chapter 2
Likewise, they unanimously teach that no good work of ours can bind God to give us a reward, and that He doesn't owe us eternal life without a pact or promise, He is only bound by His own word, intrinsically and is a debtor to Himself, as we explained in the previous blog. No man can justly demand from God eternal blessedness unless God Himself first promised it freely. They teach that the acceptation of our works proceeds from the promise of God, rather than the works themselves:
"Nor does Scripture fear to call eternal life the reward of good works, not that we should think our good deeds are worthy of eternal life or that eternal life is owed to them because of the worth of the works themselves. For who is so foolish as to think so? But rather that God has promised eternal life to our faith, which is exercised through such works."- Canons of the Jesuits in Cologne, Enchiridion, On Justification
“But such a distinct divine promise or ordinance would only be necessary to induce an obligation in God for the bestowal of the reward. For since He is the absolute and supreme Lord of all, He cannot be obligated or made a debtor to anyone unless by His own pact, promise, and special acceptance”
- Bartholomaei Mastrius, Disputation 3 “On the Merit of Christ and of others through Him”, art. 2
Furthermore, the theologians of the Roman church unanimously affirm that some reward accrues to us from the merit of Christ, and that in a sense, God rewards above condignity. This means that in view of the merits of Christ, our works are sprinkled with his blood and we are given beyond what we deserve, in view of His superabundant grace and the infinite value of His merits. Bellarmine in his fifth book On Justification, chapter 19 testifies to this point when he says that “God rewards good works above condignity." This is confirmed by the papal bull against the heresies of Michael of Louvain, one of the condemned articles says that "The good works of the just will not receive on the day of the last judgment a greater reward than they justly deserve by the judgment of God”. Therefore, it is plainly evident that some reward is given to us above what we merit in view of the merits of Christ, although different schools understand this differently as we shall see. We have now examined what all Roman theologians have agreed upon to set a foundation for the controversies going on in their schools, in the following section we shall deal with the diverse opinions of the scholastic theologians.
Controversies on merit
1. Whether the works of the righteous have an arithmetic or a proportional equality of value with eternal life?
In order to answer this question, it is relevant to pay close attention to a useful analogy employed by Gregory of Valencia (1549-1603), a Spanish Jesuit, and professor of theology at the University of Ingolstadt.
"For, if money by the command of a prince is made of some base material, which considered in itself is not worth as much as the things that can be exchanged for it, then indeed, if this money is considered absolutely, without regard to the prince's decree, it is certain that according to commutative justice it is not equal to the things that can be obtained for it; but if it is considered as subject to the prince's decree and law, by which it is ordained that whoever presents such money shall obtain necessary things according to the established value of the money, then in this way, the money is valued at as much as the things themselves that can be obtained by it. Thus it is in this proposition. For if the work of the just is considered precisely in itself, it is not equal to glory. But if it is considered as subject to the divine promise, by which through it glory can certainly be obtained, then it can be valued at as much as that glory, and in this way, it is equal to glory."- "Summa Theologiae," volume 2, disputation 8, question 6, point 4.
For arithmetic equality to exist, it would be the case that the base metal without the princely decree is of absolutely equal value with the precious reward. Proportional equality between things requires that some princely decree enhance in some way the value of things; proportional equality is found also in things that differ formally, but have the same virtue, as the relationship between the means to the end, between a seed and the fruit that arises from it, between a way and the terminus that it leads to, etc. What gives value to things? Is their value so intrinsic to the nature of things that no human agreement and extrinsic acceptance and favor is required for the determination of something's value?
It's worth noting as Faber and Mastrius correctly say that the value of different objects and metals depends completely on human agreement and convention. For instance, in the 16th century the population of the new world estimated european weapons as having more value than gold, while europeans ascribed more value to gold than to iron made weapons. So, to every metal or object there is ascribed a certain value recognized by a particular society, and such value is relative, depending on the society in which you are, as mentioned in the example above. This is the reason why we can make comparisons between things and say “object X has less value than object Y”, because there is an already existing estimation and some value ascribed to them by the common agreement of the society in which we live. So when Gregory of Valencia speaks about “some base metal considered in itself” he presupposes this first agreement, or the agreement of the society through which we can make comparisons between things. Supposing an already existent agreement about the value of the base metal which is inferior to the value of the precious reward, Gregory introduces the decree of the prince or local authority (which is a secondary agreement or convention) which ascribes value to certain things beyond the value which is already ascribed to it by the common agreement of the society. Therefore a base metal which considered in itself is of inferior value compared to the reward (in the estimation of society- the first agreement), but by the liberal decree of the prince he determines that what is of inferior value by common societal estimation be considered of higher or equal value to the reward, and that the reward can be bought even with a payment which considered in itself is less valuable. Considering this analogy, there is a controversy in the Roman Church about whether the “money” (our good works) are in themselves, by first agreement of equal value with the reward of glory; or whether they are of equal value by second agreement. In the first case, the money would be made of a metal that by itself values as much as the reward, whereas in the second case while the metal doesn't itself value as much as the reward, but by the prince's decree and ordination it is considered equal. The former position would posit an arithmetic or absolute equality; the latter would a geometric or proportional equality. Among those who support the first position, we can count Gabriel Vasquez, Augustine Monk, Peter of St. Joseph, Puteanus, Martin Becanus, etc. Among those who support the last position, we count Gregory of Valencia (which we cited), Alphonso a Castro and in the canons of Cologne.
Arithmetic equality
"The works of a just man and one existing in a state of grace are in themselves worthy and proportionate to eternal life, because they proceed from grace which is the seed of glory, nevertheless, God is not bound by justice to recompense them, apart from the pact and promise.” - Martin Becanus, "Summa of Scholastic Theology," volume 2, treatise 4, chapter 5, number 11.
“It has always seemed to me much more probable and more consonant with Catholic doctrine, first, that the value and dignity of eternal life should be ascribed to the works of the just without any pact and favor, by the very fact that they are done in a state of justice through the help of moving grace.”
- Gabriel Vasquez, Disputation 214, chapter 5
[A key component of Vasquez’ thinking is the notion that a work not otherwise worthy cannot be made worthy by acceptance and extrinsic favor, as long as it is not changed in itself and has that value by its own nature, intrinsically]
Proportional equality
"If Luther, when he says that there is no merit of man for glory, takes merit to mean such a work that by its own nature and from itself is equal to the reward; certainly his opinion is not to be noted as an error, because there is no such work of ours that can be equated with eternal glory. But merit is not taken to imply such equality but another kind of equality, which does not arise from the nature of things, but from a certain pact, by which the work becomes equal, which was not previously said to be equal."- Alphonso a Castro, Against Heresies, Book X
It is worth noting that proportional equality does not arise from the nature of things, as we said above there is only a virtual equality (equality of power) between seed and fruit, the way and the terminus which leads to it; although they differ in value, and formally.
2. Whether the merits of Christ increase the dignity or worthiness of our works?
On this particular topic, it is important to distinguish between the glory and the dignity of our works. All Roman theologians affirm that some glory is given to us beyond what we condignly merit, and this is in view of the merits of Christ. Bellarmine (On Justification, Book V, chapter 19) testifies that “God rewards good works above condignity”, pointing at the fact that there will be more glory that will belong to us than we justly merited, this corresponds to Luke 6. Vasquez is of the same opinion:
"From the fact, that God rewards above condignity, the condignity of the good work for eternal life is not overthrown, because when God rewards a good work deserving glory with double glory, He does not take away from the work the fact that it, according to strict justice, merited glory.”- Cardinal Cajetan, ST 1-2, Q. 114, art. 3
That some glory beyond what we merit is given to us in view of the merits of Christ is affirmed by the Roman theologians. However there is a great disagreement between them whether the merits of Christ increase the dignity of our own works or whether the power and efficacy of our merit is derived from the merits of Christ communicated to us. The state of controversy can also be noted differently: supposing there be two just men, one who has grace through the merits of Christ, and one who has equal grace independent of the merits of Christ, and both perform a good act that is meritorious in nature, whether the former merits more than the latter who does not merit through the grace of the merit of Christ? Among those who affirm we can count Cajetan, Thomas Stapleton, Costero etc; among those who deny: Vasquez, Oviedo, Turrianus, Montesinus, Arriaga, Andreas Vega, etc.
The affirmative position
"Our righteousness and merits depend on the righteousness and merits of Christ, not only because, as the universal principle of reforming the human race, He imparts grace by which we both work justly and merit by working; but also because, being made one with Christ, we have obtained that our merits, as the merits of Christ our head, merit before God through Him and for His sake.”- Thomas Stapleton, On Justification, Book 10, chapter 4
"Just as, if a rustic were forming characters moved by the hand of the King in writing, the writing which is partly produced by the rustic is of no weight; but because the King guided the hand of the scribe in writing and delineating, it has great dignity: so our works, because of Christ, who uses us as members and the indwelling Holy Spirit, and who works through us, are worthy of heavenly reward."- Costero, Enchiridion of Controversies
There was a significant debate on the phrase coined by Cardinal Thomas Cajetan [constructed in imitation of Galatians 2:20]: “I merit, yet not I, but Christ merits in me”. This phrase was supposed to promote the idea that our merits are de facto the merits of Christ in us, that our merits derive power, efficacy and value from the merits of Christ from whom we receive not only the grace to do good works, but the power of meriting itself. Numerous other theologians opposed this phrase, saying that it gives support to the opinion of the “heretics” (protestants) who deny the true reason of merit belongs to our works themselves, but refer all the nature of remuneration and to the liberal promise of God and the merit of Christ.
The negative position
“The other part of our opinion, which we proposed to confirm in ch. 4, is that no increase of dignity comes to the works of the just from the merits or person of Christ, which they would not otherwise have if they were done from the same grace liberally bestowed by God alone without Christ. In confirmation of which, it must be noted that it is one thing for some glory to be given to us in view of the merits of Christ beyond what our works condignly merit, and another for our works to have some greater dignity from the grace or person of Christ, than the same would otherwise have from the sole grace liberally given to us by God without Christ. For in the former case, our works would not be made more worthy than they would otherwise be, but beyond their dignity something would be given to us in view of the merits of Christ alone and His impetration.”- Vasquez, vol. 2, Disputation 214, chapter 7
The main premise of Vasquez is that the value of a work is by no means ascribed to it by the acceptance of a higher authority, and that it is not this acceptance and extrinsic favor that gives value to the work, but simply and entirely the good nature of the work itself. He denies that the promise of God to reward us imparts any new worthiness or value to our works, because it would be an impossibility for works, otherwise not worthy in their own nature to be worthy solely by acceptation and extrinsic favor of God (from the promise). From this principle he reasons also that the dignity of a work cannot be increased or decreased by extrinsic favor, it can only have any value if it is so in its own nature. And this is “because works are said to receive value and dignity from the person from whom they proximately proceed (from us), but not from the person from whom the grace and help which contributes to them proceeds (from Christ).” (ibid.)
A few of the arguments Vasquez adduces to prove his position are: firstly, that if the dignity of our merits be increased and derived from that of the person of Christ (even an increment), our works would be of infinite value and would merit for us infinite glory, which cannot be. Secondly, it would follow from the former that if the dignity of our works be increased by the merits of Christ (and thus have infinite value) we could merit justification and the remission of sins for another individual. And lastly, it could be said that our works merit eternal life by the rigor of justice, as Christ Himself has.
3. Whether the nature of merit is derived from our works alone, or from the divine promise alone, or from our works insofar as they are completed by the divine promise?
On this subject, there are these three positions common in the roman church. In light of the political and financial analogy (see question 1) this question might be parced out differently. The first opinion would suggest that the nature of merit is derived from our works alone, not from the pact and promise of God. However even the theologians supporting this opinion wouldn't deny that God isn't obligated to reward our works unless by a pact or promise. In light of our analogy, let's suppose a person goes before the prince and the prince did not promise anything to him, no agreement was made about a reward. This man has enough money to pay for a particular good which belongs to the prince, and while the value of the payment and of the prince's good be equal, the prince cannot be obligated to give his own possession in exchange for an equal price, unless there was a pact/agreement or convention. Therefore the entire nature of merit lies in the payment itself (the works), since the faithful person has enough good works to pay for eternal life, he deserves it by right, however God is not obligated to give him anything if no agreement or pact is made with man. These theologians define merit as “a work worthy of praise and honor”, and do not include in this definition a debt of justice on the part of God. They do not distinguish between worthiness and merit. To merit implies a work deserving of a reward, and the obtaining of praise and honor on account of it. For them God is not bound by justice when He rewards, but He rewards out of gratitude for the works offered to Him. Therefore, in order to obtain from God praise and honor (which is distinct from the reward of eternal life) it is only necessary that the works themselves be worthy, and have an equality with the reward. This is the view of Gabriel Vasquez which is shared by other theologians. He writes that:
"Now indeed, that we may confirm our opinion by reason, those three things which we proposed in the preceding chapter are to be proved in their order; and in this and the following chapter, we must show that the good works of the just are of themselves, without any pact and acceptance, worthy of the remuneration of eternal life, and have an equal value of condignity for obtaining eternal glory; which we established to be confirmed in the first part of our opinion against the opinion of Scotus and others mentioned in the first chapter.”- Gabriel Vasquez, disputation 214, chapter 5
This group of theologians also held that it is catholic, appropriate and excellently taught if it be said that heaven is given to us for sale. Among these we count Gabriel Vasquez, the Jesuits of Cologne, Jacob Payva, Augustine Monk, Hosius, Franciscus Horantius, etc.
“Our Jesuits of Cologne have excellently taught that heaven is proposed to us for sale, because it was to be compared to condign merits as to an equal price. Which opinion, as being Catholic, Chemnitz indignantly bore, and sharply refuted, for no other reason indeed than to remove the dignity of our merits from the midst, and consequently to deny the true and perfect nature of merit to our works, and to refer the whole remuneration of eternal life to the word and promise of God, as we have seen in the preceding disp., c. 4. But Jacobus Payva, excellently defends the opinion of our Jesuits and crushes and shatters the calumny of Chemnitz.”- ibid. disp 215, chapter 2
He also holds that his view is the one that can fight best against the heresy of protestantism, concerning which he believes that the scholastics who held the second opinion mentioned above agree with the heretics on this question, and so I ask where is Vasquez’ consistency here, for he says in the begining of Disputation 214, article 1, “once the truth of the merit of the good works of the just has been asserted against the heretics, it would seem to pertain more to scholastic speculation than to the explanation of our faith to dispute whether the nature of merit is to be ascribed to the good works of the just simply from a pact and the acceptance of God, or whether by their own nature”. To which he adds in Article 5 that, “nevertheless, the cited scholastics seem to agree with the heretics in this, that before the promise and divine acceptance, our works have no proper and true nature of merit, that would constitute the dignity of eternal life”. If the scholastics which he cites as favorable to the second opinion agree with the “heretics” in substance but disagree in words, how does his disputation with other theologians in the Roman school who held the second view be a matter of “scholastic speculation rather than of the explanation of our faith”? It seems that, if these theologians held heretical opinions in substance, there is significant disagreement about the articles of faith, not a mere scholastic speculation; and that this group of theologians were themselves heretics.
The second opinion, which holds that the entire nature of merit is derived from the divine promise alone was shared by Scotus (Ordinatio I, d. 17, q. 2), Gregory of Rimini, quæst. 1, art. 3; Gabriel Biel, quæst. 3, art. 3, dub. 2, etc. In light of the analogy described in question 1, we may describe the position thus: a person goes to the prince who already promised him a reward if he present himself, and he brings to the prince a certain amount of money which does not value as much as the promised reward, but by the decree and estimation of the prince the insufficient value of the payment is accepted, and rewarded by the prince, since there is a proportional equality or fittingness to it. The entire nature of merit thus belongs to the gratuitous promise of God who, even though our works do not value as much as eternal life, he rewards them beyond what they are worthy.
The third is the most common opinion, namely that prior to the promise and pact of God, the good works of the faithful are condign for eternal life and have an equal value with the reward. However, what makes these works meritorious of eternal life is the divine promise. These theologians distinguish between the condignity necessary for eternal life and the nature of merit (contrary to the first opinion). These works are fully condign for eternal life (worthy of it by themselves), but since to merit means to obtain a reward from God distinct from praise and honor (Mastrius, Disputation of the merit of Christ, question 1, art. 1), they say that the faithful do not merit or obtain eternal life from God without the divine promise. Moreover they teach that God rewards out of justice, and not mere gratitude (in contrast to the first opinion), and they define merit differently as we have seen, which is why they distinguish between worthiness and merit. From the second view they differ in this, that they believe that the faithful to not obtain the reward from God merely from the divine promise, but also because of the dignity of the works themselves. Also in contrast to the second opinion they affirm that the works of the just are condign for eternal life in themselves, and are not increased by the estimation of God. Theologians that support this third position are Bellarmine "On Justification”, Book V ch. 17. Peter of Saint Joseph in "The Idea of Speculative Theology" book IV, ch. 11. Resolution 4. Becanus in "Summa Theologiae" Tom. 2. tract. 4. cap. 5. num. 11.
4. Whether eternal life is owed to the faithful out of the rigor of justice- that is strict and proper justice?
On this question, most theologians have rightly taught that God doesn't owe the faithful eternal life by the rigor of justice, or as it is said in the schools, by strict and proper justice. The reason for this lies in the fact that to obtain something by strict justice requires such a contract that there is no grace and liberality between the two parties. Those who dissented were not consistent in affirming that God rewards us out of strict and proper justice, and that He is not bound extrinsically to offer anything to us except by His own promise. The reasons why there cannot be between us and God strict and proper justice, can be summarized in the following way: God is our Creator, and all that we are and have belongs to Him entirely; and He is our Redeemer and bought us with His own blood. If a master owes nothing to the servant whom he bought with money, and even after the servant has worked all that he was suppose to, the master owes him nothing, how much more is this the case with God, to whom we owe so much on so many accounts? Therefore, it is impossible to be rewarded out of strict justice, where according to common understanding, all grace and liberality is excluded from the contracting parties.
"Between God and men, there cannot be exact justice as it is between men. For God cannot be obligated to us in such a way that, excluding His merciful grace, He remains bound to us by anything.”- Costero, Enchiridion
Therefore, those who deny that God rewards us out of strict justice, say that He rewards us by justice according to a more common meaning, or justice broadly taken. This is often understood as faithfulness, which is a kind of broadly taken justice, according to which a person who keeps his word is said to be just and faithful.
5. Whether God rewards the faithful out of commutative justice?
Concerning this question, commutative justice as we established in the begining is that justice that deals with the fairness of exchanges between two parties. Such justice necessarily includes: 1) a mutual giving and receiving involving mutual substraction and and addition from each party's posessions, 2) an equality of value between work and reward, 3) and finally a debt of justice in the retributor (see introduction). If all of these conditions are not met, there can be no commutative justice. Let's now examine each of these conditions and see the implications for the relationship between good works and eternal life. Firstly, the “equality of thing to thing” (arithmetic, not proportional equality)- that good works are fully equal in moral value to the reward of eternal life. Then, a mutual exchange happens between us and God: we give God our works, He receives them; God receives our works and as a result gives us a reward. Such mutual exchange can only happen if there is a mutual benefit or damage acquired between both parties, or a substraction and an addition on both sides. To use an analogy: if I would sell to a friend my car in exchange for a different car, I would subtract something from my possession and give it to him, he would subtract something from his possession and give it to me; we would both add something to what previously did not belong to us. Those theologians who taught that God is thankful to us for our services and rewards us out of gratitude denied that we are rewarded out of commutative justice, because such justice requires a debt of strict justice in the retributor. [We will critique this perspective as well as every other perspective not in line with the historic Protestant view in the next blog.]
Among the theologians who affirm that God rewards the faithful out of strict, commutative justice we count Francisco Suarez, Cardinal Thomas Cajetan (both cited by Davenant, in De Iustitia Actuali, ch. 57), and by Peter of St. Joseph in The Idea of Speculative Theology, Book I, ch. 17.
Therefore the controversy between Catholics and Protestants cannot be summarized simply because of the numerous differences and opinions found in roman catholic schools. However, we can discuss with what views there is controversy on this point. We are in controversy with those theologians who hold that: 1) that God rewards us out of commutative justice, as Suarez holds; 2) that eternal life is owed to us out of the rigor of justice; 3) that the entire nature of merit is from our works alone, and thus it can be said that heaven is given for sale, as Vasquez teaches; 4) or that the nature of merit is partly from works and partly from the promise, as the majority of the Roman school teaches; 5) that God rewards us out of gratitude, 6) that there is an arithmetic equality of value between our works and eternal life. Although our position is a minority in the Roman school, and increasingly so after Trent, there is no controversy with those few theologians that teach: 1) that God rewards us out of distributive justice, not out of strict and proper justice or commutative; 2) that God does not reward us out of gratitude; 3) that the entire nature of merit is taken from the promise and pact of God, that is His grace, rather than our works; 4) that there is a proportionality, and not an arithmetic equality of value between good works and eternal life.
Illustrious protestant theologians are of the same opinion:
“But all those who say that good works merit eternal life de condigno and yet teach that the entire dignity and merit of good works depend on a gratuitous pact of God; or at least, if before God's promise they are to be called worthy of eternal life, they do not yet have strict justice equality with it; but only some congruence and suitability, and that eternal life is not to be retributed to them out of proper and strict justice; but out of God's faithfulness and the appropriateness of His goodness, which is broadly called justice: therefore, good works do not have the nature of strictly taken merit with respect to eternal life and do not merit it according to the entire rigor of justice: all these doctors, I say, agree with us in the substance of the matter, although they follow a mode of speaking which we rightly disapprove of.”- LeBlanc, Theological Thesis, p. 837
“If the opinion of merit of condignity be taken away, (viz., in so far as the good works, or, as the Latin Fathers call them, the merits, of the just, in that they proceed from the Holy Ghost, are asserted to have a certain intrinsic value or worth, equivalent to the wages, and by which notion only they cannot be reconciled with God's grace in giving life eternal:) and if the worth or condignity of the works (for it is of no moment which of these expressions you use) be altogether ascribed to God's mere gratuitous promise, and to His gracious acceptation of them-that this controversy might easily not only be arranged, but even altogether cease between moderate men."
- William Forbes, Considerationes Modestae et Pacificae, Vol 1, p. 495
"The Catholics called the good works performed by the faithful through grace, though imperfect, merits, not from the intrinsic worthiness of the work, but from the benevolent promise and acceptance of God, graciously rewarding with the need of further grace or of glory that work commanded by Himself and performed through His grace, though imperfect; mercifully at the same time, and justly, not according to the rigor of commutative justice, but according to the immovable tenor of God's covenanted justice. Scotus agrees, not placing the reason of merit in the act itself, or its intrinsic goodness which it has from its own principles, but in the mere gratuitous ordination and divine acceptance of that act to a reward, which God from mere liberality promises and renders, not from the debt of strict justice in respect to the act itself considered, but from mere liberality (in 1 Sent. dist. 17, qu. 3, nn. 25 and 26)."
- John Forbes of Corse, Instructiones historico-theologicae, p.389
Conclusion
This should suffice to explain the papist views in brief, accurately, and sufficiently inasmuch as we desire by this to offer an opportunity to engage with their own sources themselves, without treating such an important issue superficially and without careful consideration. In the following blog, we shall critique the position of all those theologians that profess wrongly on this point, and establish the truth against such errors.
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